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Allen v. United States
122 S. Ct. 2653 (2002)
L Facs
On November 28, 1994, three men robbed an armored van outside a
Dillard's department store in Glendale, Arizona. The van's courier went into the
store and when he returned, the van's driver, John Mogach, and the vehicle were
gone. Maricopa County Sheriff's Deputies found the van later that day with its
doors locked, its engine running, and Mogach dead from a single gunshot to the
head. The van was missing $562,000 in cash and $271,000 in checks. With the
help of wiretaps and cooperation from the local media, the police monitored
three suspects, James Greenham, William Ferguson, and Timothy Ring. On
February 16, 1995, the police executed a search wan-ant at Ring's house and
discovered more than $271,000 in cash and a note splitting a total of $575,995
between "F," "Y," and "T."'
At trial, Ring testified that the cash was start-up capital from moneyhe had
made as an FBI informant and a bail bondsman. The trial judge instructed the
jury on the charge of premeditated murder, and in the alternative, felony murder.
The jury deadlocked on premeditated murder, but convicted Ring of felony
murder. Under Arizona law, the judge was required to make additional findings
of aggravating factors in order to sentence Ring to death.2
After Ring's trial, Greenham pleaded guilty, later, at Ring's sentencing
hearing, Greenhamtestified that he, Ring, and Ferguson had planned the robbery
several weeks prior to November 28,1994. Greenham further testified that Ring
was the leader, had shot Mogach with a silenced rifle, and had chastised his
partners for forgetting to congratulate him on his shot. Greenham admitted he
was changing his initial statement, which did not implicate Ring, and that his
testimony was a reprisal against Ring.'
The trial judge entered a "Special Verdict" and sentenced Ring to death on
October 29, 1997. The judge based his conclusion, that Ring had been the killer,
on Greenham's testimony. The judge also found two aggravating factors-Ring
1. Ring v. Arizona, 122 S. C. 2428, 2432-33 (2002).
2. Id at 2433-34.
3. Id at 2435.
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had committed the offense in expectation of pecuniary gain and his comment
expressing pride for killing Mogach indicated depravity of mind.'
Ring appealed his sentence to the Supreme Court of Arizona and argued
that Arizona's capital sentencing structure violated his Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendment rights because a judge, not a jury, made a finding of fact that
increased the maximum penalty. The Supreme Court of Arizona found that the
sentencing scheme did require the judge to make factual findings that increased
the maximum penalty, but, relying on the United States Supreme Court's holding
in Wamnv A nzcor,' it rejected Ring's constitutional challenge and reviewed the
aggravating factors." The court found that there was insufficient evidence to
support the aggravating circumstance of depravity, but upheld the death sentence
based on the aggravating factor of pecuniary gain. Ring petitioned the United
States Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari and it was granted."
When the United States Supreme Court handed down its opinion in Rir
it also remanded A li v Uniti State; to be considered in light of its opinion.'
Billie Jerome Allen and Norris Holder entered the Lindell Bank & Trust in St.
Louis, issouri, on March 17, 1997, armed respectively with Chinese and Rus-
sian SKS semi-automatic rifles. The men fired sixteen shots inside the bank,
eight of which hit and killed the bank's security guard. Allen and Holder robbed
the bank and attempted a getaway. In order to destroythe getaway van, the men
had soaked the vehicle in gasoline. One of the men, however, flicked a cigarette
lighter, and the van caught on fire. Holder also caught on fire and was arrested
almost immediately. Allen was arrested the following dayand both were charged
in federal court with "armed robbery by force or violence in which a killing
occurs" ("Count I") and "carrying or using a firearm during a crime of violence
and committing murder" ("Count II"). The two men were tried separatelyand
found guiltyof both counts. Holder was sentenced to death on both counts, and
Allen received a sentence of life imprisonment for Count I and a sentence of
death for Count II.
Allen appealed and raised numerous constitutional challenges to the Federal
Death Penalty Act of 1994 (FDPA7)." In one of these challenges, Allen
claimed that his Fifth Amendment rihts had been violated because his indict-
ment did not allege the aggr g factors relied upon during his sentencing
4. Id
5. 497 US. 639 (1990).
6. Rirg 122 S. C. at 2436; s Walton v. Arizona, 497 US. 639,649 (1990) (holding that the
additional facts weighed byan Arizona judge in capital sentencing were not elements of the offense,
but sentencing considerations; therefore, the Sixth Amendment was not violated).
7. Rig 122 S. C. at 2436.
8. 122 S. C. 2653 (2002).
9. Allen v. United States, 122 S. C. 2653 (2002) ("A fiml).
10. United States v. Allen, 247 F.3d 741,755-57 (8th Cr. 2001) (AIkm').
11. Id at 757; soeFederal Death Penaky Act of 1994,18 U.S.C S 3591 (2000) (outlining the
process for sentencing a federal defendant to death).
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phase. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Crcuit rejected this
claim and affirmed Holder's and Allen's death sentences.12 Both men appealed
to the United States Supreme Court."
I. Hddig
The United States Su reme Court reversed Ring's death sentence, and held
that ApprrVri v NewJesey4 and Walto are irreconcilable." The Court held that
Arizona's aggravating factors are elements of the offense, and that the Sixth
Amendment requires that a jury determine the aggravator's existence.16 There-
fore, the Court overnuled Wal$t; insofar as it allowed a judge to determine
aggravating factors necessary for a sentence of death."' Shortly thereafter, the
Court vacated the death sentences in A He; and remanded the case for further
consideration in light of Ri. s
III A ntbsis
The Court determined that the maximum punishment Ring could have
received based on the juy's verdict was life imprisonment." The judge was then
required to find at least one aggravating factor, beyond a reasonable doubt,
before he or she could increase the penalty to a sentence of death." In order to
determine if this process violated Ring's Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury,
the Court first looked at whether aggravating factors are elements of the
offense.2  The Court considered its decisions in Appeii and low v Uniad
Statz 2 and found that in cases in which the enumerated aggravating factors
function as elements of a greater offense and act to increase the maximum
penalty, the Sixth Amendment requires that they be found beyond a reasonable
doubt by a unanimous jury.' Prior to Rin the Court's decision in Wan had
12. AlmI,247F.3dat761.
13. AfemII, 122S.0. at 2653.
14. 530 US. 466 (2000).
15. Ring 122S.0. at 2443;saeApprendiv. NewJersey, 530 US. 466,476-85 (2000) (holding
that the Sixth Amendment prtects a defendant from receiving a punishment that exceeds the
maximum penalty he wouldyae received based on the facts found bythe juryverdict alone).
16. Rig 122 S. CL at 2443.
17. Id
18. A!en/ H, 122 S. CL at 2654.
19. Rig 122 S. 0. at 2437.
20. Id
21. Id at 2437-42.
22. 526 US. 227 (1999).
23. Rir 122 S. C. at 2438-40; s, eg, A ppmn 530 US. at 476 (stating that where proce-
dural safeguards exist when charged with one act that carries a penalty, the same safeguards must
exist for another act that also carries a penalty, labeling one act a sentence enhancement" does not
extinguish the right of procedural protection); Jones v. United States, 526 US. 227, 243 n.6, 252
(1999) (finding that a carjaciting statute that listed three acts with three different penalties must be
2002]
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excluded the application of Appnnri to death penalty cases because it held that
Arizona's aggravating factors were not elements of capital murder- they were
limitations on sentencing.24 The Court in Ringoveniled Watcn and found that
aggravating factors are not mere sentencing considerations; theyare elements of
the crime and must be determined by a jury."
IV. Applicadw
A. FaeralAppUiaai
1. Thtpeak Effas on Faeral CGpal Iniants
The Court in 1cm held that the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause and
the Sixth Amendment notice guarantee require that any fact which increases the
maximum penaltybeyond the statutorymaximum must be charged in the indict-
nent.26 Because the statutory aggravators in the federal death penalty statute
increase the maxiu penalty that could be imposed without a finding of the
statutoryaggravators, federal indictments must charge the aggravators in a capital
murder indictment.27 If the indictment does not allege a statutory aggravator, it
is insufficient.
2 Staiv qfReuewfbrlmzoj&e Indmwm s on Di Apped
On direct appeal the indictment requirements presented in Joe and af-
firned in Rig apply because a final judgment has not yet been reached. A
defendant currently in the direct appeal process can argue that his sentence
should be vacated if his indictment failed to allege a statutory aggravator. How-
ever, because the indictment was sufficient pre-Ri manyattomeys probablydid
not object to the indictment at trial If an attorney did not object to the indict-
ment at trial, the Court's high standard announced in UnitmaStaw v Ccttd will
apply on direct appeal.29
treated as three distinct offenses and each offense "must be charged in an indictment, submitted
to a jury, and proven beyond a reasonable doubt").
24. Rig 122 S. Q. at 2438 (citing Waamn 497 US. at 649).
25. Id. at 2443.
26. ]cm, 526 U.S. at 243 n.6.
27. See 18 U.S.C S 3593(e) (explaining that the jury "shall consider whether all [sic] the
aggravating factor or factors found to exist sufficiently outweigh all [sic] the mitigating factor or
factors found to exist to justify a sentence of death, or, in the absence of a *itigat factor,
whether the aggravating factor or factors alone are sufficient to justifya sentence of death");se also
18 U.S.C S3593(c) (stating that the "burden of establishing the existence of any faor
is on the government, and is not satisfied unless the existence of such a factor is estalished bevnd
a reasonable doubt"). See m=ay 18 U.S.C S 3592(c)(1- 16) (listing the statutory aggravators that
the jury shall consider).
28. 122 S. . 1781 (2002).
29. United States v. Cotton, 122 S. Ct. 1781,1783 (2002. The Court in Qtindicated that
a sentence that has been illegally enhanced should be objected to at trial. Id The Court held that
[Vol. 15:1
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he defendant in Czam was charged with and found Fdiy of drug offenses
that involved selling a "detectable quantity of cocaine."3 Yet, the judge sen-
tenced Cotton under a statutory section that required a finding of at least fifty
grams of cocaine." The initial statute carried a maximum penaltyof twentyyears;
the second statute carried a maximum penalty of life. 2 Cotton was sentenced to
thirty years?3 The language of Caw indicated that had his attorney objected at
trial, the omission from the indictment of a fact that increased the maximum
sentence would have justified vacating the enhanced sentence. 4 The applicable
lesson in light of Rig is that prosecutors must allege which aggravating factors
they intend to prove in the indictment and defendants must have the right to
plead to these factors. If the Government omits factors supporting an enhanced
maximum sentence, objection to the indictment must be made at trial.
If the objection to the indictment is not made at trial, Ca established a
difficult test. The Court in Claw explained that if an objection is not made, an
appellate court may only vacate an illegally enhanced sentence if the trial court
committed plain error which affected substantial rights of the defendant." Even
if the appellate panel finds plain error, it has discretion to determine whether the
error seriously "affects] the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial
proceedings."36 The Court in Ctm determined that the error in that case did
not have a serious effect on the fairness, integrity, or reputation of the proceed-
ings; Cotton's sentence therefore, was affirmed."' The fact that the Court
remanded A ien for reconsideration, presumably because Allen's indictment did
not include the aggravating factors that led to his sentence, indicates that capital
indictment challenges should fare better than Cotton's challenge." The Court's
decision to remand A lei does not, however, nullify the standard explained in
Catcw; therefore, it is necessary to distinguish the Caw challenge from capital
indictment challenges.
Rirgis factuallydistinguishable from Ctuin In 0bmp, the judge determined
a fact that involved a measurable amount- whether or not there was evidence
if the error is not objected to at trial, the error must threaten the fairness and reputation of judicial
proceedings for the sentence to be vacated. Id at 1785-86.
30. Id at 1783.
31. Id
32. Id
33. Id at 1784.
34. Id at 1783. The Court stated that it was addressing "whether the omission from a federal
indictment of a fact that enhances the statutory maximum sentence justifies a court of appeals'
vacating the enhanced sentence, ezm dx10 tedOnW6tdidnot a* in etr z unif Id (emphasis
added). This language implies that if the defendant had objected at trial, the court of appeals'
vacation of the enhanced sentence would have been justified.
35. COm 122 S. C. at 1785.
36. Id
37. Id at 1786. The United States Supreme Court reinstated Cotton's original sentence. Id
38. A ilm I, 122 S. C. at 2653; seeA 1m , 247 F.3d at 762.
2002]
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of fifty grams of cocaine." The Court emphasized that this fact was largely
uncontroverted. ° In light of these conditions, the judge's determination did not
seriously affect the proceedings. In a challenge regarding an omission of aggra-
vating factors, a court maybe more likelyto find a serious effect on the proceed-
ings. To begin with, the defendant in Catmwas on notice, from the time of the
flawed indictment, that he would face charges centering around the sale and
distribution of cocaine." During his trial, Cotton had the opportunityto defend
against testimony and evidence that indicated the amount of cocaine in
question 2 The judge then made a factual determination- whether the defen-
dant possessed less than fifty grams of cocaine or more." If, for example, the
Government decides to prove the aggravating cicurnstance of committing the
offense in a heinous, cruel, or depraved manner, and that element is omitted
from the indictment, the defendant suffers a greater loss. He is not put on notice
from the time of the indictment how his actions are going to be categorized.
Without this notice, his defense cannot be complete. In this instance the error
is not a judge making a decision based upon grams and dollars, but a jurymaking
a subjective decision on how best to categorize a defendant's actions. This
distinction should support attempts to demonstrate that omitting aggravating
factors from capital indictments seriously affects judicial fairness, integrity, and
public reputation.
3. St rmd qRedewfor Im ki Inhonw m CdLaenxl Reuew
a. App6J Teague v. Lane
Before Rirgcan be asserted retroactivelyon collateral review, a federal court
must analyze its applicabllityunder Tewwv Lae." For the purposes of retroac-
tive application of a rule of constitutional criminal procedure, the Court in Tague
defined a "new rule" as a rule that "breaks new ground or imposes a new obliga-
tion on the States or Federal Government" and is not the result of a precedent
existing at the time the defendant's conviction became final4 Ring imposed a
new obligation on the State and Federal Governments and the decision was not
based on existing precedent. Even if Rirgis viewed as an extension of Appnu-k
39. CQx 122 S. C. at 1786.
40. Id
41. Id at 1783.
42. Id at 1786 n.3.
43. Id at 1784.
44. Teague v. Lane, 489 US. 288,311 (1989) (holding that new criminal procedure rules, that
are not based on prior precedent, do not apply to defendants who have received final judgments,
unless the rule falls within two narrowexceptions); sEHorn v. Banks, 122 S. Cx 2147,2150(2002)
(affirming that a threshold question in everyhabeas case is whether the court must applythe Tave
rule to the defendants daim); Janice L Kopec Case Note, 15 CAP. DEF.J. 133 (2002) (analyzing
Horn v. Banks, 122 S. Cc. 2147 (2002)).
45. Tagg 489 US. at 301.
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RING & ALLEN
it would not qualify as a result of an existing precedent because Appmnri, in
reliance on Wan, specifically excluded capital proceedings from the Appmni
rule. 6 As a new constitutional rule of criminal procedure, Ringis not applicable
on collateral review unless it falls into one of two exceptions.
The first exception outlined in Taue applies to new rules that place a class
of conduct beyond the State's power to proscribe.47 The Court has held that this
exception does not apply only to rules prohibiting the punishment of certain
conduct; the exception also applies to rules "prohibiting a certain category of
punishment for a class of defendants because of their status or offense. 49
Because Ririhas altered the elements of capital murder, it has altered the offense.
This alteration results in two different offenses- capital murder in which the
aggravators are proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt, which can result in
a sentence of death, and capital murder in which the aggravators are not proved
to a jurybeyond a reasonable doubt, which can only result in life imprisonment.
The latter offense creates a class of defendants against whom a certain category
of punishment, death, is now prohibited. Because the state is prohibited from
imposing death on a group of defendants because of the altered nature of the
offense, Rrg should fall into Tngrds first exception.
Tevds second exception is "reserved for watershed rules of criminal
procedure" which "'alter our understanding of the Mb'Xb pro a1 detu."
49
The Court does not, however, define the term "bedrock procedural element."
In formulating a Teague argument, attorneys should not ignore the fact that the
Court has been loathe to grant retroactivity under this second exception.'s
46. Wara, 497 US. at 649.
47. Teitg, 489 US. at 311 (stating that the first exception a pplies to rules that place "certain
kinds of primary, private individual conduct beyond the power of the criminal awm authoriy
to proscribe," (quoting Mackeyv. United States, 401 US. 667,692 (1971))).
48. Saffle v. Parks, 494 US. 484, 494 (1990) (citing Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 US. 302, 330
(1989) (expanding the first exception of Taeg to cover new rules that prohibit a certain class of
punishment for a group of defendants because of their status or offense)). The Court relied on
Justice Harlan's words from Mackey, 'There is little societal interest in permitting the criminal
process to rest at a point where it ought properly never to repose." Per 492 US. at 330 (quoting
MaeK 401 US. at 693).
49. Terge, 489 US. at 311 (quotingMade, 401 US. at 693).
50. Se United States v. Sanders, 247 F.3d 139,148 (4th Gr. 2001) (denying a Tagtexcep-
tion to Jem and Appzi and stating that there have been eleven new or proposed rules that the
United States Supreme Court has refused to exempt under Tange (citing United States v. Mandanic,
205 F.3d 519, 529-31 (2d ar. 2000))). Seegwfdky Lambrix v. Singletay, 520 US. 518, 539-40
(1997); Gray v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 170 (1996); Goeke v. Branch, 514 US. 115, 120-21
(1995); Caspariv. Bohlen, 510 US. 383,3% (1994); Gilmore v. Taylor, 508 US. 333,346-56 (1993)
(O'Connor, J., concurring); Graham v. Collins, 506 US. 461,478 (1993); Butler v. McKellar, 494
US. 407,416 (1990). The United States Supreme Court cites Gdeonv Waimmyr, which held that
in all criminal prosecutions the Sixth Amendment requires that the accused have assistance of
counsel and that the states must appoint counsel if he or she is indigent, as an example of a
watershed principle. O'Dell v. Netherland, 521 US. 151, 167 (1997) (explaining that Gidam v
Wainskb contained a watershed rule of criminal procedure that would be excepted under Tawg
2002]
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Nevertheless, Ringcan be distinguished from other cases that the Court analyzed
under Tbagrds second exception.
In Sawerv Snith,51 a capital defendant attempted to convince the Court that
Teazg's second exception applied to GadtUd u Mississppi.2 The Court in CldzUdl
decided that when an instruction diminished a jury's sense of responsibility, the
defendant's Eighth Amendment rights had been violated.3 The prosecutor in
Sazrertold the juryin his closing argument that it should not feel responsible for
executing the defendant should it choose to sentence him to death; nevertheless,
the Court held that the Tagwe exception did not apply.' The Court stated that
an enhancement of the accuracy of capital sentencing buttressed fundamental
fairness, but it is not an "absolute pre-requisite to fundamental fairness," and
therefore, the Gdd& rule was not a bedrock principle."5  Rirg can be distin-
guished from Saw)er because Rrg alters who is to be the final decision-maker in
capital sentencing. Unlike Ring, Sawyer was not denied the appropriate decision-
maker.-6 The division of decision-making is a basic notion of criminal jurispru-
dence arising directlyfromthe Sixth Amendment; therefore,Rvgdoes not simply
enhance fundamental fairness, it augments a fundamental principle.
In 1Dd v Na, dand"' the Court considered whether Smm vu Scwth
Crdim s8 met Tza,'s second exception. 9 The Court in YDdI held that the
Sirnmm instruction onlyprovided a narrow right of rebuttal to a limited class of
capital cases; therefore, it did not alter the Court's understanding of bedrock
procedural elements.' Ring is distinguishable from CYDdl because it does not
just provide for a mere rebuttal, but for a fundamental alteration in the elements
of a capital crime; it does not applyto a limited class of cases, but to all capital
(citing Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335,342-43 (1963))).
51. 497 US. 227 (1990).
52. Sawyer v. Smith, 497 US. 227,232 (1990) (holding that the rule expressed in Caldudi v
Mississopi does not constitute an exception under TaW4; seC.akiwell v. Mfississippi, 472 U.S. 320,
328-29 (1985) (holding that it is constitutionally i issible to rest a death sentence on a
determination made by a sentencer who has been led to believe ... that the responsibility for
determining the appropriateness of the defendant's death rests elsewhere").
53. Ca/duA 472 US. at 320-21.
54. Sanw, 497 U.S. at 231, 244-45.
55. Id at 244 (quoting Tasei, 489 US. at 314).
56. Sawyer was convicted and sentenced to death by a Louisiana jury. Id at 230.
57. 521 US. 151 (1997).
58. 512 US. 154 (1994).
59. O'Dellv.Netherland,521 US. 151,157-58 (1997) (holdingthat Sirmm was anewrule
and did not fallinto the Txueexceptions);seSimrnons v. South Carolina, 512 US. 154,154(1994)
(holding that where the defendant is parole ineligible and future dangerousness has been introduced,
due process requires that the defendant be allowed to bring his parole ineligibility to the attention
of the jury).
60. MDA 521 U.S. at 167 (O'Connorj., concurring). ODdicautions in its dissent that since




cases. Furthermore, MDd, like Saw~r, did not contain a shift in the division of
decision-making power from judge to jury.
Tiler V Gai, 1 relied on a case somewhat similar to Rir but it too was
denied a Teagw exception.' Tyler relied on Cage v Lcausiam6 3 to argue that his
right "to have the jury make the determination of guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt" had been violated." Tyler employed this argument to advance the theory
that such a violation undermines the reliability of the trial outcome; the Court
evidently did not consider this a bedrock principle, although it never explained
its decision." ageprovides that if a jury interprets its instruction not to require
proof beyond a reasonable doubt, the instruction is flawed because the jury did
not make a true determination of guil. Rather than determine if this rule is a
bedrock procedural element, the Court focused on the fact that it could have
offered retroactive application on collateral review and chose not to do so."'
Tierinforms Rirgbecause the Court never made a statement on the merits of the
argument, which implies that a rule involving a jury's determination of guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt has not yet been excluded from Tagzds second
exception This decision makes possible the argument that Rig alters a defen-
dan's right to a jury determination of fact by increasing the elements that must
be decided by a jury. The right to a jury in a criminal proceeding is protected
under the Sixth Amendment in such a way that Riig should be perceived as a
bedrock procedural holding.
h Api)gAEDPA
If RiVis granted an exception under Tazgw courts on collateral review must
consider its application under the AEDPA standard of review." AEDPA
specifies that the appropriate standard of review in a habeas proceeding is
whether the lower court's decision was an unreasonable application of, or
contrary to, established federal law.69 If R4r becomes a retroactive rule of
61. 533 US. 656 (2001).
62. Tyler v. Cain, 533 US. 656,659,665-66 (2001) (holding that the rule in question was not
made retroactive to cases on colateral review).
63. 498 U.S. 39 (1990).
64. T*ier, 533 U.S. at 665; seeCage v. Louisiana, 498 US. 39,41 (1990) (per curiam) (holding
that if there is a likelihood that the jury interpreted its instruction not to require proof beyond a
reasonable doubt, the instruction is unconstirutional).
65. Tler, 533 US. at 666.
66. GA 498 US. at 41.
67. Ty'er, 533 U.S. at 666.
68. Se 28 US.C S 2254(d)(1) (2000) (stating that a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to any
claim heard bya state court shall be denied unless the adjudication of the claim-(1) resulted in a
decision that was contrazyto, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearlyestablished Federal
law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States;" part of the Anti-Terorism and




constitutional criminal procedure, its holdings must be treated as established
federal law and Rvg claims may be heard in habeas proceedings."0 An AEDPA
review of Rir's application can arise in two circumstances. If a capital defendant
completed his direct appeals and received a final judgment prior to Rirg a habeas
court must consider if the last state court's decision was a reasonable application
of R4e. In most circumstances, the reviewing court could not have reasonably
applied Rirg because it issued its decision be ore was handed down. It is
likely that an AEDPA review would result in a remand for reconsideration in
light of Ring. However, if a defendant is in habeas court and his direct appeals
did not conclude before Rirg was handed down, the AEDPA standard would
assume a different role. The habeas court must consider how the last court
applied Rirt and if that application was reasonable or if it was contrary to the
holdings of the case.
B. Apphias&m in V~va
Ring affects directly the sentencing structure of Arizona, Colorado, Idaho,
Montana, and Nebraska; these states leave both the penalty fact-finding and the
ultimate sentencing decision entirely with the judge." Alabama, Delaware,
Florida, and Indiana have a hybrid system in which the judge makes the final
sentencing decision based on a jury's advisory verdict.' Rings insistence that
every element must be determined by a jury places all eight of these systems in
jeopardy. Rir's application in Virginia is less direct, though not less significant.
1. Ra nA ramuo as E lemwt
The Court in Rirgrejected the notion that aggravating factors are sentencing
enhancers.73 Rather, it labeled the aggravators "elements" of the offense because
theyultimatelyincrease the maximum penalty' 4 The aggravating factors must be
found beyond a reasonable doubt by a unanimous jury" Like the Arizona
statute at issue in Ri, if, in Virginia, an aggravator is not found, the maximum
70. See 28 US.C S 2254(e)(2)(A)(i) (stating that the habeas court will not conduct an
evidentiary hearing on a clim unless the claim is based upon "a new rule of constitutional law,
made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavail-
able-).
71. Rigw 122 S. C. at 2442; (citing QoLO. REV. STAT. S 16-11-103 (2001); IDAHO CODE$
19-2515 (MIlchie Supp. 2002); MONT. CODE ANN. S 46-18-301 (2001); NEB. REV. STAT. 5 29-2520
(1995)).
72. Id (citing ALA GODE SS 13A-5-46, 13A-5-47 (1994); DELCODE ANN., it. 11S 4209
(2001);FLA. STAT. ANN. S 921.141 (West 2001); IND. CODE ANN. S 35-50-2-9 (Mlichie Supp. 2001)).
73. Id
74. Id (explaining that a factor "used to describe an increase beyond the maximum autho-
rized statutory sentence ... is the functional equivalent of an element of a greater offense" (quoting
Appmwr 530 U. S. at 494 n.19)).
75. Id at 2443; Appmi, 530 US. at 490.
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punishment for capital murder is life imprisonment;76 therefore, the aggravators
can increase the maximm sentence and must be considered elements of the
offense. As elements of the offense, an aggravator in Virginia must now be
found beyond a reasonable doubt by a unanimous jury.
Virginia Code Section 19.2-264.4(C) already states that the death penalty
cannot be imposed unless the Commonwealth proves one of two aggravating
factors- future dangerousness or vileness- beyond a reasonable doubt.
Vileness is broken into different sub-elements which include torture, depravity
of mind, or aggravated battery of the victim" Because a finding of vileness in
Virginia requires a finding of one of the enumerated sub-elements, the sub-
element is an element of the aggravating factor. In application, this means that
the Commonwealth must submit which element and sub-element(s) it is alleging,
the jury must find the element- and in the case of vileness, the sub-
element(s)-beyond a reasonable doubt, and its finding must be unanimous.
Ensuring this procedural protection could require polling the jury to determine
that if a defendant is sentenced to death based on vileness, every member of the
jury found the same sub-element.
2. Effeis cCapit Munrer Iniiawn m the Stat
Attorneys can argue that the Virginia capital murder indictments must allege
future dangerousness or vileness and the vileness sub-elements. The Court in
Jrzs noted that the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment requires that
elements that increase the maximum penaltyfor a crime be charged in an indict-
ment.9 The Fifth Amendment right to indictment by grand jury does not apply
to the states.'O However, the Sixth Amendment notice requirement does apply
to the states;"' because Rirgredefines aggravators as elements, states are required
76. SeeVA. ODE ANN. S 19.2-264.4(p (Mhie 2000) (sta ithat "the penaltyof death shall
not be imposed" unless the Gommonwealth proves at least one of the statutory aggravators).
77. Sm i (stating that the Commonwealth must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant "would constitute a continuing serious threat to society," or that the defendant's offense
was "outrageously or vantonly vile").
78. Se id (stating that an offense is vantonly vile "in that it involved torture, depravity of
mind or aggravated battery to the victim").
79. Joew, 526 U.S. at 243 n.6. SaevmfityA lle I, 122 S. Ct. at 2653.
80. Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516,534-35 (1884) (holding that the Fifth Amendment
right to indictment by grand jury does not apply to the states).
81. Cole v. Arkansas, 333 US. 196,201 (1948) (stating that "[oprinciple of procedural due
process is more clearlyestablished than that notice of the specific charge, and a chance to be heard
in a trial of the issues raised by that charge, if desired, are among the constitutional rights of every
accused in a criminal proceeding in all courts, state or federal").
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to give notice of the elements to the defendant. Virginia satisfies its Sixth
Amendment notice requirement through a statutory right to an indictment. 2
Virginia case law has held that an indictment must include all of the essential
elements of the charged offense; if any of the elements are omitted, the indict-
ment is fatally defective."3 The indictment must provide the defendant with
adequate notice of the nature and character of the offense charged in order to
enable him to prepare a defense. 4 The nature and character of vileness is
substantially different from the nature and character of future dangerousness;
therefore, notice of a specific aggravator is necessary to prepare an adequate
capital defense. Furthermore, if the sentencing aggravators are omitted from the
indictment, not all of the essential elements are charged and the indictment is
fatally flawed. If the Commonwealth fails to allege the aggravators in the indict-
ment and later tries to amend the indictment to include them, that amendment
is prohibited by Virginia case and statutory law.8" Because Ring redefines Vir-
ginia's aggravators as essential elements of capital murder and Virginia courts
have held that essential elements must be charged in the indictment, future
dangerousness or vileness and a vileness sub-element must be alleged in the
indictment.
6
82. SeVA.CODE ANN. S 192-217 (Mlchie 2000) (stati that "no person shall be put upon
trial for any felony, unless an indictment or presentment shall Lave first been found or made by a
grad juryin a court of competent jurisdiction"); seeaho VA. CODE ANN. S 19.2-216 (Mlchie 2000)
defining an indictment as "a written accusation of crime, prepared by the attorney for the Com-
monwealth and returned "a true bill" upon the oath or affirmation of a lealy impanelled grnd
jWu); VA. CODE ANN. S 19.2-215.8 (ilchie 2000) (stating that a "true bill" of indictment must
be returned with a majority of the grand jurors agreeing to its findings).
83. Hagood v. Commonwealth, 162 S.E. 10, 12 (Va. C. App. 1932) (stating that it "is of
course necessary for an indictment to set forth all of the essential elements of the crime, and, if any
of them are omitted, it is fatally defective").
84. Grier v. Commonwealth, 546 S.E.2d 743, 746 (Va. 2001) (stating that an indictment
should include "'notice of the nature and character of the accusations against'" an accused (quoting
Sims v. Commonwealth, 507 S.E2d 648, 652 (Va. Ct. App. 1998))).
85. Powell v. Commonwealth, 552 S.E.2d 344,356-57 (Va. 2001) (holding that the defen-
dant's conviction for capital murder under an amended indictment could not stand (citing VA.
CODE ANN. S 192-231 (lchie 2000))). The Commonwealth in Poud attempted to amend the
capital murder indictment from a charge of capital murder in the commission of a robbery to a
charge of capital murder in the commission of a robbery and/or a rape. Id at 356. Section 19.2-
231 provides that an amendment to the indictment is permitted unless it changes the nature or
character of the offense charged. S 19.2-231. The court held that the amendment to the indictment
did change the nature and character of the offense charged. PouA 552 S.E.2d at 357. Because Ring
makes the aggravators elements of the offense which must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt,
the aggravators are analogous to the gradations of the crime of capital murder which Pot.'1 held
cannot be amended.
86. In cases in which the indictment fails to allege future dangerousness or vileness, and guilt
has been determined, the defense can make a motion to prevent the Commonwealth from seeking
death. SeJanice L Kopec, Case Note, 15 CAP. DEF.J. 197 (2002) (analyzing Hartman v. Lee, 283
F3d 190 (4th ar. 200)).
RING & ALLEN
3. Lack fEffxt cnM kay Mimran Czes
Rirg does not affect cases in which the judge makes a determination that
increases the mandatory nimmon sentence. 1 The Court held in Harris ,v United
State,88 that facts that increase the mandatory minimum are not to be treated
categorically as elements of the offense.8 9 In a penalty statute with mandatory
minimums, sentencing factors are treated as limitations on the judge's authorized
choices.9° On the surface, the facts in Harris indicate that the judge made a
determination of fact that resulted in a higher penalty for the defendant.9' Harris
was indicted for distribution of marijuana and for carrying a firearm in relation
to drug trafficking. 2 The firearm statute provided a maximum of ten years and
a mandatory minimum sentence of five years imprisonment for possession of a
fireann n The statute also provided a mandatory minimum sentence of seven
years if the firearm was "brandished." 94 The judge determined that Harris had
brandished the weapon and sentenced him to a term of seven years imprison-
ment.9' Even though the judge's determination increased Harris's penalty, it did
not increase the penalty above the statutory maximum; therefore, Appwrei did
not apply.' Defense attorneys should be aware of when they can advance
demands for the procedural rights granted in R4g- in cases with a statutory
maximum penalty- and when they cannot- in cases with only a mandatory
minimum penalty.
V. Canaon
On a federal level, R4g has direct consequences on capital indictments.
Aggravating factors and their elements must be alleged by the grand jury in the
indictment. The Court's remand of A en indicates that indictments that do not
allege every element used in sentencing will be treated as plain error. Whether
or not this plain error will amount to vacating all illegally enhanced capital
sentences has yet to be determined. Furthermore, the general question of
whether Rigs holding will be retroactive cannot be answered until an argument
87. Rig 122 S. Cc. at 2441 n.5 (citing Harris v. United States, 122 S. ai 2406 (2002)).
88. 122 S. C. 2406 (2002).
89. Harris v. United States, 122 S. Ct. 2406, 2413 (2002) (holding that "brandishing" a
firearm was not an element of the crime, but a sentencing factor, and that a judge can determine
a sentencing factor that affects the mandatory minimum penalty without violating constitutional
rights)-
90. Id at 2409.
91. United States v. Harris, 243 F.3d 806, 807-08 (4th Cir. 2001).
92. Id at 807.
93. Id at 808.
94. Id at 807-08.
95. Id at 807.
96. Hams, 122 S. Ct. at 2409.
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for a Tzgue exception has been put forward and decided. For Virginia capital
defenders, the crucial effect of Ringis that the aggravators are elements and must
be charged in the indictment, and a jurymust find everyelement and sub-element
in the sentencing phase unanimously.
Janice L. Kopec
